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ABSTRACT 
Network anomalies are correlated to activities that deviate from regular behavior patterns in a 
network, and they are undetectable until their actions are defined as malicious. Current work in 
network anomaly detection includes network-based and host-based intrusion detection systems. 
However, network anomaly detection schemes can suffer from high false detection rates due to the 
base rate fallacy. When the detection rate is less than the false positive rate, which is found in 
network anomaly detection schemes working with live data, a high false detection rate can occur. 
To overcome such a drawback, this paper proposes a superior behavior-based anomaly detection 
system (SuperB) that defines legitimate network behaviors of authorized users in order to identify 
unauthorized accesses. I define the network behaviors of the authorized users by training the 
proposed deep learning model with time series data extracted from network packets of each of the 
users. Then, the trained model is used to classify all other behaviors (I define these as anomalies) 
from the defined legitimate behaviors. As a result, SuperB effectively detects all anomalies of 
network behaviors. The simulation results show that SuperB needs at least five end-to-end network 
conversations to achieve over 95% accuracy and over 93% true positive rate. Some simulations 
achieved 100% accuracy and true positive rate. The simulations use live network data combined 
with the CICIDS2017 data set. The performance has an average of less than 1.1% false positive 
rate, with some simulations showing 0%. The execution time to process each conversation is 85.20 
± 0.60 milliseconds (ms), and thus it takes about only 426 ms to process five conversations to 
identify an anomaly.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Network Anomaly Detection Introduction 
Cyber attacks on computer networks are becoming a huge problem as network connectivity and              
data increases [1], [2], [3]. When an attacker gains access to a network, internal network security                
mechanisms require some type of identification of activities to detect the attacker. Attackers have              
learned to masquerade as legitimate users or avoid certain actions to avoid detection [1].              
However, the behavior of the attackers differs to some degree from that of normal users. There                
are established patterns of behavior within network data that are unique to each network.              
Anomaly detection takes advantage of these patterns to identify abnormal behaviors within a             
network by creating a general baseline of normal behavior. This anomaly detection approach can              
be greatly beneficial to networks with a group of consistent users, such as a private office or a                  
research laboratory network. 
 
Anomaly detection is a large focus of network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS), which             
is a classification of intrusion detection systems (IDS) [3], [4]. Many NIDSs using a supervised               
learning approach have high false-positive rates due to the constantly changing behavior and the              
diversity of networks [2]. Even, they require a challenging task of obtaining attack-free network              
data which will be used to train the supervised learning. Unsupervised and semi-supervised             
approaches can be effective for anomaly detection as they can contribute to reducing             
1 
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 false-positive rates by the capability of detecting unknown anomalies [5], [6]. Semi-supervised            
and hybrid approaches comprise the majority of work in anomaly-focused NIDS and show             
superiority to supervised learning approaches [2], [7]. Host-based intrusion detection systems           
(HIDS) are another classification of IDS that only focus on particular host systems. They are               
similar to NIDS as they focus on anomaly detection and can suffer from high false positives                
without hybrid approaches [8]. 
 
Minimizing false positives is crucial as most anomaly detection schemes have the Bayesian base              
rate fallacy, which states that near-zero false positives are required for low false detection rates               
[9]. Even with 100% recall and low false positives, the false detection rate can still be high.                 
Despite there being much research in machine learning techniques for anomaly detection, not             
much machine learning is implemented in live networks due to solutions not being industrially              
viable and requiring supplemental detectors to handle false anomaly detections [1], [2], [9], [10].              
Additionally, there has not been much exploration for a parameter for anomaly detection with              
machine learning solutions that corresponds with decreasing false positives and false detections. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Network behavior is defined as sequential bidirectional flow-based data among various           
sources and destinations. Normal behavior within a network can be defined as the most              
common behaviors exhibited over a period of time. Normal behavior must be of             
non-malicious intent with regards to an assumed purpose of a network. Abnormal            
behavior can be regarded as a complement of normal behavior. A more refined definition              
2 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 2C895588-AF15-47A1-B85C-5A9F8704F79C
 is any uncommon behavior of malicious intent that diverges from an assumed purpose of              
a network. Normal and abnormal behavior cover the complete set of behaviors that can be               
exhibited within a network. 
 
In traditional approaches, anomaly detection relies on normal network behavior that has been             
defined by the complement of known abnormal behavior or a broad definition of normal              
behavior. When a broad definition of normal behavior is used, each network’s normal behavior              
will not be fully defined due to network diversity, so only the complement definition is               
examined. Consider a group ​G ​of all behaviors in an arbitrary network. Let each ​S ​i ​∈ G ​be a                   
different set of behaviors within the group of behaviors ​G​. Let ​S ​n ​be all defined normal                
network behavior, ​S ​m be all unknown behavior, and ​G\(S​n ∪ S​m​) ​be all known abnormal               
behavior. The following is a traditional definition of normal behavior 
 
G\(S ​n​ ∪ S​m​) ≡ (S ​n​ ∪ S​m​) 
 
with the following assumption that 
 
|(S ​m​\(S ​n ​∩ S​m​))\((G\(S ​n ​∪ S​m​)) ∩ S ​m​)|>0 
 
This assumption states that there exists some unknown abnormal behavior within S​m​.            
Assuming otherwise claims that a network security system recognizes all possible           
3 
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 vulnerabilities. It is clear that (S​n ​∪ S​m​) ≠ S​n ​meaning this definition of normal network behavior                 
includes some unknown abnormal behavior.  
 
Creating a general baseline of normal network behavior has not been adopted uniformly             
due  to  the  diversity  in  how networks  are  structured  and  function  [2].  However,  users  are 
a commonality among networks, and their behavior within a network can be classified             
through packet data analysis. Defining the normal behavior of individual users in a network              
can serve the same purpose of defining normal network behavior. Combining each user’s             
behavior in a binary classification of ‘user’ or ‘others’ creates a formalized definition of              
normal behavior that can be used to better classify known and unknown abnormal behavior as               
anomalous. 
 
The problem addressed in this thesis is the identification of novel abnormal behavior within live               
networks. The process of identifying this novel abnormal behavior involves establishing a            
tailored baseline of normal behavior for any particular network based on a general solution.              
Additionally, recognized attacks can be included in the baseline as known abnormal behavior.             
Then, any behavior not recognized within the baseline of normal behavior is flagged as either               
known or novel abnormal behavior. This method must easily work with existing enterprise-level             
technology as the use case is for live networks at companies. 
 
 
 
4 
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 1.3 Contribution 
This thesis proposes a superior behavior-based anomaly detection system (SuperB), which           
defines authorized users’ legitimate network behaviors so as to classify all other behaviors             
against them. The system treats behaviors that are not the legitimate behaviors as anomalies.              
SuperB is a combination of a residual neural network (ResNet) and a recurrent neural network               
(RNN), which maximizes the detection accuracy while achieving a false-positive rate of near             
zero percent. The ResNet is composed of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) with many             
residual blocks. The ResNet extracts behavior found within each user's conversations to find             
hidden patterns that are unique to each user. The RNN then combines the patterns of multiple                
conversations discovered by the ResNet to establish a behavior pattern over a short time span.               
Thus, the model strives to create a true model of a user's normal behavior through a binary                 
classification of normal and abnormal behavior. This binary classification can detect unknown            
patterns in new data. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, SuperB is the first anomaly detection scheme that defines               
authorized users' network behavior to detect network anomalies for standard network traffic.            
This scheme can be applied to any network traffic with proper formatting of the input network                
data. For the effective demonstrations of SuperB, I perform comprehensive simulations with two             
datasets: (a) network conversation data from the CICIDS2017 dataset [11] and (b) network             
conversation data collected from individuals in my laboratory. All data is formatted with the              
open-source Wireshark software, facilitating industry adoption of SuperB. 
5 
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 CHAPTER II 
NETWORK DATA BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Network Data Format 
There is a general format of network data known as a PCAP, which is an abbreviation for packet                  
capture. A PCAP is an application programming interface (API) written in the C programming              
language that is used in capturing packets sent over a network. A PCAP stores an entire session                 
of network activity, including endpoint-to-endpoint metadata and the data sent between           
endpoints. The data sent between endpoints is typically endpoint-to-endpoint encrypted and           
cannot be decrypted solely from looking at a PCAP. A PCAP file can be very large depending on                  
the network being captured, reaching into the tens of gigabytes if not hundreds. The size is                
determined by how much network traffic occurs on the network while capturing and the duration               
of the capture. 
 
2.2 Network Data Analysis Software 
The most common software used in analyzing PCAP files is Wireshark. This software is              
open-source and widely used both in education and industry for reading PCAPs. Wireshark is              
similar to another common software tcpdump that is used for reading PCAP files; however,              
Wireshark is significantly more user friendly as it has a graphical front-end and integrated              
filtering of various network features. Wireshark can both read saved PCAPs and capture a new               
PCAP live from the wire. When reading individual packets in Wireshark, packets that are              
6 
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 encrypted, usually by endpoint-to-endpoint encryption, cannot be decrypted and show up as            
hidden data masked by some hex code pattern generated by whichever endpoint sent the              
encrypted packet. When looking at the metadata of packets, Wireshark has many options for              
different filtering. One such option is called a conversation view. Here conversation is             
synonymous with session. The conversation view shows all conversations, or sessions, that occur             
over a network and includes metadata such as IP addresses, ports used, number and speed of                
packets sent and received, and bits sent over the wire between endpoints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
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 CHAPTER III 
RELATED WORKS 
 
In statistical anomaly detection research, a study proposed a Principal Component Analysis            
(PCA) based anomaly detection scheme for high-dimensional network flow [12]. Later, the            
robust statistics-based approach utilizes fitting and flagging on the network data for an             
enhancement to the existing PCA detection methods [13].  
 
Classification-based schemes are prominent research trends in anomaly detection. In the studies            
of utilizing Support Vector Machine (SVM), several attempts have been made to improve the              
classification performance by combining various schemes with conventional SVM-based         
detection models. Authors in [14] apply One-Click Neural Network (OC-NN) that utilizes            
One-Click SVM (OC-SVM) as a loss function. Employing Deep Belief Network (DBN) also             
shows meaningful results in generic feature extraction for anomaly detection, as           
demonstrated in [15]. According to [4], applying Weighted Chi-Square (WCS) is another            
option for improving detection rates through a discretization process that reduces the            
dimensionality of data. In [16], a restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM) is proposed for             
network anomaly detection in a semi-supervised learning approach that trains on normal traffic             
data only for a more general definition of abnormal behavior. 
 
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) architecture is another prominent method for anomaly           
detection. The study in [17] generates an LSTM-based language model to predict            
8 
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 communications between IPs and analyze prediction error to detect traffic outliers.           
According to [18], detection performance can be improved through the combination of            
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), LSTM, and Deep Neural Network (DNN) for complex            
feature extraction. As noted in [19], DNN-LSTM log pattern detection model that            
automatically detects anomalies through the analysis of deviated log data also can be             
used. Authors in [20] employ Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) and CNN to provide a better               
detection rate than the traditional LSTM Method. 
 
Boosting is an ensemble classification technique enhancing the accuracy of weak classifiers. The             
two representative boosting algorithms proposed for anomaly detection are Adaboost and           
Logitboost [20], [21]. The studies employed Adaboost and Logitboost each in anomaly detection             
researches to gain a high detection rate and low false-positive rate. 
 
In the GAN-based detection scheme, the reconstructor network generates anomalous traffic,           
and the detector network classifies anomalous traffics and normal traffics in an adversarial             
manner [22]. 
 
In a deep learning detection scheme, architectures that use both a CNN and RNN for IoT                
network traffic classification are discussed in [23]. The authors show that using various             
CNN and RNN combinations yield better results of anomaly detection without feature            
engineering. This research is very similar to my work and supports my claim of high               
performance. 
9 
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The use of CNNs for network anomaly detection is explored in [28]. The authors show that deep                 
learning is better than shallow learning due to the non-linearity of network data sets. The               
research compares simple CNN models to other deep learning structures and shows that other              
deep learning structures are superior.  
In [29] the authors propose a time-series approach using a CNN that regards time-series as a                
one-dimensional image with the one dimension being temporal. The research is applied to basic              
streaming data that does not include network data sets. However, the authors show that a CNN                
architecture can be coupled with a time-series without an RNN. 
10 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEEP LEARNING METHODS 
4.1 Convolutional Neural Network 
A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a deep learning algorithm that takes input data, 
typically an image, and assigns some importance value to parts of the input data to distinguish 
among different input data. The input data is a two-dimensional grid of values size J​ ​  x J. 
For image input data, these values are the pixels in the image. A CNN has multiple layers. 
Between layers, there is an alternation of convolutions and max pooling, and this process 
happens to the same initial input data ​N ​  times with each having a unique filter used 
during convolutions. Between the initial input data and the first layer is a convolution that uses 
filters of size ​F​  , which is less than the dimensions of the input data. These filters create 
compressed data for the first layer that has a dimension size of ​K ​  x ​K, ​  where ​K ​  = J​​   - (​F - 1). 
Between the first layer and the second layer, max-pooling occurs. Max-pooling down-
samples data to provide a better abstraction to help prevent overfitting and reduce the 
number of learned parameters of the model. Max-pooling can reduce the data by a variable size; 
however, common max-pooling reduces the data by a factor of two. For example, the second 
layer would have a dimension size of ​L ​  x ​L where ​L ​  = ​K​  /2. This pattern of convolutions 
followed by max-pooling continues until the original input data is sufficiently reduced. 
All ​N ​  resulting compressed data is then fed into a fully connected layer to compare 
results between the different filtering processes. After the fully connected layer is an output  
11 
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Figure 1: Diagram of a standard convolutional neural network 
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layer with abstracted features from the original input data. Figure 1 shows the architecture of a                
simple CNN. 
4.2 Residual Neural Network 
A Residual Neural Network (ResNet) is a deep learning modular architecture with multiple 
layers that involves skip connections. An example of the modular architecture can be seen in 
Figure 2. The skip connections are shortcuts between layers that aren’t usually connected. The 
reason for these skip connections is to solve the vanishing gradient problem, which is where the 
updated gradient for a layer in a model can be very small and not cause any change and thus 
learning in the weights in the layer. The vanishing gradient problem is a well-known issue with 
deep learning models. The ResNet architecture can be applied to various multi-layer neural 
networks to help increase depth while mitigating the absence of learning via potential vanishing 
gradients. The ResNet architecture consists of a modular building block design where for every 
two layers with weights, there is a skip connection. The skip connection is typically an identity 
mapping from before the two layers that is added to the output after the two layers. In the 
example here, we also see the rectified linear unit (ReLU) activation function, which is a 
commonly used activation function that transforms the weighted input for each layer into the 
output of that particular input. When looking at the layers more granularly, the ReLU transforms 
the summed weighted input of a node in a layer to the activation of the node. The ReLU also 
helps with overcoming the vanishing gradient problem as it is a piecewise linear function that 
outputs the input if the input is positive and otherwise outputs zero. The ReLU also has other 
13 
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benefits such as sparse representation within model learning and simple computation due to it 
really only requiring a max function such as: 
def relu(x): 
   return max(0, x) 
14 
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Figure 2: Diagram of residual neural network building block 
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4.3 Recurrent Neural Network 
A Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) is a deep learning algorithm that deals with a series type of 
input instead of the traditional fixed size data input that general neural networks use. The series 
input for an RNN has no limit on the size of each item in the series; however, the inputs all have 
to be the same size as the inputs share parameters to gain better insights. Instead of making 
generalities about a single input data, oftentimes a vector, an RNN looks at how a series of inputs 
relate to one another. This is represented by a hidden state vector that represents the inputs and 
outputs among the items in the series. The hidden state deals with both encoding the input data 
and decoding the output data using previous series item information and the current series item 
input data. In addition to learning relationships among items in a series. RNNs learn while 
training, just like other neural networks. RNNs can be made deep with three possible methods 
[26], including multiple hidden states used per item in the series. RNNs can also be bidirectional 
where a second hidden state is used that moves in the opposite direction of the initial hidden 
state. Modern RNNs can use a long short-term memory (LSTM) architecture as well. The LSTM 
architecture uses cells that are responsible for keeping track of dependencies among portions of 
the input. These cells are the housing for the hidden state vectors and help with the vanishing 
gradient problem common with basic deep learning architectures. Diagrams of a normal RNN 
and bidirectional RNN can be found in Figure 3. In Figure 3, each ​h​t ​ ​represents a 
forward-moving hidden state vector, ​g ​t  ​represents a backward-moving hidden state vector, and 
x ​t  ​and  ​y​t  ​represent the inputs and outputs, respectively. 
16 
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Figure 3: Diagrams of a basic recurrent neural network and a bidirectional recurrent neural 
network
17 
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4.4 Attention Layer Architecture for RNNs 
In a standard RNN algorithm, there exists a problem where longer input sequences make it 
harder for the hidden state vector to capture and retain earlier inputs and subsequent updates to 
those inputs. Essentially the more updates made to the hidden state vector, the higher likelihood 
that information on earlier states is lost. This challenge is solved using an attention architecture 
proposed by Bahdanau et al in [27]. The attention architecture makes the final output a function 
of all hidden states. Each decoder output has a distinct vector produced by the attention 
architecture where the encoder hidden states are represented with distinct weights given to the 
different encoder hidden states. The output step for an attention layer architecture has a distinct 
context vector that is a sum product of the attention created weights and hidden states. The 
attention mechanism is attached to an RNN as an added layer, hence why it is referred to as the 
attention layer. A couple of drawbacks of using attention are the heavy computations needed for 
all of the created context vectors and the lack of parallelization since the nature of the hidden 
state vector requires sequential processing. An example of an attention layer architecture is seen 
in Figure 4, where each  ​h ​t  ​represents a hidden state, ​S​t  ​represents the summation from all the 
hidden states, and  ​x ​t  ​and  ​y​t  ​represent the inputs and outputs, respectively. Details on the power 
of attention can be found in [25]. 
18 
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Figure 4: Diagram of an attention layer architecture 
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 4.5 Combining Neural Networks in a Model 
Individual neural network architectures can be combined to create more sophisticated models 
that can give much better insight from input data. For instance, consider analyzing a video for 
when a live person appears in the video and not just a static image of a person. A combination of 
a CNN and RNN can be used to determine if a live person appears. The CNN portion could 
recognize in each frame of the video whether or not the frame contains a person. The RNN 
portion could then look at the series of frames to determine if the person in each frame is moving 
or static. Using just the CNN could result in false positives, and using just the RNN could only 
show that frames were different without identifying a person within each frame. These more 
complex architectures have component architectures that are modular as neural networks output 
vectors that can be adjusted to fit input parameters for other neural networks. 
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 CHAPTER V 
SUPERB MODEL 
 
5.1 Model Design 
The proposed model for SuperB is a deep learning network made of a nine-layer residual               
neural network (ResNet) with an added fully connected layer that feeds into two             
bidirectional recurrent neural network (RNN) layers with an added attention layer. The            
ResNet is for spatial pattern detection to find relations between different columns in the              
network data that is used in the model. The ResNet can detect behavior patterns a human                
would not understand. The RNN is for time-series pattern detection to find complex relations              
among different time series data that humans would not understand. For instance, there             
might be a pattern between time series data separated by three time series that the RNN                
can detect. Following the RNN is another fully connected layer. In total, there are 16               
layers in the model. Figure 5 shows the general architecture of the deep learning network. The                
first two layers deal with data collection and transformation. The first layer is the data input of                 
the labeled data. In Figure 5, normal behavior is labeled as P​1 ​and can be any desired user                  
endpoint in a network that has consistent behavior patterns. The second layer is the flow features                
layer, which is the process of feature selection and formatting of the input data. The feature                
selection is the subset of the features found within the conversation filtering of Wireshark.              
The formatting translates any nominal features into a binary output where selected nominal             
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features are made probabilistic and readable by the deep learning network. The formatting of the               
data is discussed in more depth previously.  
The next 10 layers consist of the ResNet, which follows the standard convolutional neural              
network (CNN) architecture for ResNets. Each layer in the ResNet has 64 filters. The first layer                
of the ResNet has filters of size four by four. The remaining eight layers have filters of                 
size three by three and comprise the main section of the ResNet in pairs of layers with a                  
skip connection after each pair. When data is fed into the ResNet, random samplings of the data                 
are taken in some batch size ​b with a time series value ​t ​. So each load of data for the                    
ResNet has ​b∗ t ​conversations. The conversations are each resized to dimensions of the              
number of features. For the experiments, the dimensions are 14 by 7 with the number of                
total features at 98. The filters in the ResNet layers compress the data and discover hidden                
patterns among each conversation. The following layer is a fully connected layer where the              
data is flattened and reshaped into dimensions of ​b ​by ​t ​by ​n ​where ​n ​is the number of embedded                    
layers that store spatial relationship data for each ​t​. These 10 layers perform spatial feature               
extraction on the data to learn feature patterns of each conversation.  
The next two layers are the RNN. In the first layer of the RNN, long short term memory                  
(LSTM) cells are used and are represented by ​A ​and ​A​’. The LSTM cells establish patterns                
from each grouping of ​t ​by looking at the sequential data. The second layer is an attention layer                  
that refines the RNN output by using all previous information learned about the inputs from the                
fully connected layer of the ResNet. The attention layer creates weights on more relevant              
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input features so that more attention is given to them while extracting patterns from the               
data. The attention layer ensures that important features are not lost as they can be with a                 
traditional RNN that has complex data as its input. These two layers look for patterns among the                 
time-series of conversations from each person. 
The last layer in the architecture is another fully connected layer that uses the spatial feature                
extraction from the ResNet and the time-series extraction from the RNN to classify each person’s               
data as either normal or abnormal. In Figure 5, this classification is split into ​P​Normal ​and                
Others, ​as ​P ​Normal ​is the selected normal behavior used in the testing. 
The number of layers in the SuperB model was established from testing various configurations of               
layers for the ResNet and RNN. ResNets of size 6, 8, 10, and 12 were used in testing. It was                    
discovered that using 10 layers gave optimal results. Initially, the RNN had only two layers               
consisting of the bidirectional LSTM cells. The additional attention layer was added to better              
capture all of the hidden states within the RNN. Thus the final count for layers was set at 16. 
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Figure 5: Diagram of the SuperB model architecture 
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 5.2 Structure of Data and Datasets 
 
Table 1: Selected features from conversations 
 
The traffic data format is a subset of features found in the conversation view of Wireshark. This                 
can be seen in Table 1. The subset of features includes both nominal and cardinal data. The                 
nominal data is translated into vector labels with each entry in the vector as a different                
named type of data. For example, a binary vector of length two is denoted (1,0) for an                 
internal IP address for Address B, while a vector of (0,1) is used for an external IP                 
address. Address B port numbers are divided into a length of three binary vector that separates                
out well-known ports 0 to 1023, registered ports 1024 to 49151, and private ports 49152 to                
65535. Addresses previously visited by each user are divided into a length four binary              
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 vector to capture all possible combinations where either Address A or Address B is visited               
previously. Address B is broken into a ​k ​-length vector where ​k​−1 is a quantity of top addresses                 
visited by users. The quantity of top addresses is 79 for the different traffic data used for the                  
research to serve as padding to reach a total column count of 98 columns to match parameters in                  
the model. One entry in the vector for Address B is a catchall case for any address not found                   
within  the  top ​k​−1 addresses of Address B. Using more visited addresses may improve overall 
results and is discussed in Future Directions. These nominal data vectors comprise the             
columns within the input data format for the model. The subset of features exclude the distinct                
source IP addresses, labeled as Address A in Wireshark and AddA in Table I, but include                
a single true or false label to ensure the source address is from a device on the network.                  
Similarly, a single true or false label is used for classifying Address A as an internal or                 
external IP address. Ports used by Address A are also excluded. These modified and              
excluded features do not contribute much insight into the behavior of each user. The              
cardinal data is z-score normalized with further outlier removal to remove bias and provide              
cleaner data for the model. Each of the cardinal data is a single column within the data format                  
and is clearly distinguishable in Table 1. 
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Table 2: Identification of collected data 
The data used in testing the algorithm is from two sources. The shortened labels for the data                 
can be found in Table 2. The first source is the publicly available CICIDS2017 data set. As                 
stated in [11], the CICIDS2017 data set was developed with realistic background traffic             
using the B-Profile system designed in [24]. This data was captured using port mirroring, so it                
is a complete capture. From CICIDS2017, data from seven of the machines are used,              
including the Windows 10 Pro 32b, Windows 10 64b, Ubuntu 14.4 32b, Ubuntu 14.4 64b,               
Ubuntu 16.4 32b, Ubuntu 16.4 64b, and MAC. These machines are considered to be users for                
the sake of the experiments. All five days of the CICIDS2017 data set are used for the                 
experiment with only four days used in the training set and the remaining day used for testing.                 
In some preliminary testing, the Windows 7 Pro from CICIDS2017 showed very strange             
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 behavior, so it has been left out of testing. In simulations using the Windows 7 Pro as labeled                  
normal or labeled abnormal behavior, the model would not learn correctly. Additionally,            
using the Windows 7 Pro for unlabeled abnormal behavior gave varying results between             
high and low accuracy. More analysis of the simulated user behaviors in the CICIDS2017              
data set is required. 
 
The second source is data collected from two network groups within the Information and              
Intelligent Security (IIS) Laboratory at Kennesaw State University. All computers used in this             
data source are Windows machines running Windows 10 64B. These groups are named             
OfficeA and OfficeB based on their respective room numbers at the college. The OfficeA data               
group consists of five users and was collected between September 17th, 2019, and             
September 30th, 2019. The OfficeB data group consists of four users and was collected              
between January 29th, 2020, and February 13th, 2020. The collection period for all IIS              
network data was between 9 AM and 4 PM for at least five hours per collection day.                 
Both the OfficeA and OfficeB data groups consist of eight days of collected network data               
per user. The network data in the IIS data set was collected using port mirroring to                
allow for a complete capture. When using the IIS data set with the CICIDS2017 data set,                
only five out of the eight days are used with four days used for training and the remaining                  
day used for testing.  
 
For both the CICIDS2017 and IIS data set, multiple days of data are used to fully cover                 
the behavior pattern of users within a network. It is assumed that a user’s behavior will                
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 remain relatively the same when observed a day at a time. However, some behavior              
activity occurs in cycles with days between the activity. Some examples include paying a              
monthly bill and online ordering of goods. Thus, at least a full business week or five days of data                   
collection is highly suggested for the model. 
 
For both the CICIDS2017 and IIS data sets, Wireshark is used to read the PCAP data.                
For the IIS data set, Wireshark is used to capture the PCAP data as well. Within Wireshark,                 
the conversation view for each PCAP is used to extract a CSV file with metadata on the                 
activity within the network during the time frame of the capture. The CSV files are               
converted into a machine learning readable format that focuses on the behavior of each              
user. The features collected and their format are previously discussed. 
 
5.3 Experiment Design 
 
Table 3: Arrangements of data 
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 For the model, I test ten different arrangements using combinations of the CICIDS2017             
and the dataset collected from my laboratory (named IIS data sets). In total, there are 32                
simulations tested using these arrangements. This is to ensure that multiple scenarios are             
tested. The arrangements are designated  as  A1  to  A6  and  are  based  around  what  sources 
are used as labeled and unlabeled behavior. A6 has 5 sub-arrangements. These can be              
found in Table 3. 
 
All arrangements except A6, A7, and A8 consist of four model training sessions with each               
model trained on a different normal behavior pattern and three abnormal behavior patterns. Each              
model has unlabeled behavior tested against each training step. Arrangement A6 only uses             
OfficeA and consists of five sub-arrangements of four model training sessions with each             
sub-arrangement training on the same normal behavior but with different configurations of            
labeled and unlabeled abnormal behavior. Each of these five sub-arrangements is averaged            
to find the individual accuracy of all five users within OfficeA. Arrangement A6 is done               
this way to show the strength of the algorithm and model against live network data. A7 and A8                  
have sub-arrangements based around using different groups of users from OfficeB for training             
and testing. This is discussed more in the Results section. For testing labeled and unlabeled               
behavior from arrangements A1 to A5, data from Tuesday is used from CICIDS2017, and              
data from the fifth collection day is used from OfficeB and OfficeA. These days are               
arbitrarily selected; however, Monday for CICIDS2017 should only be used for labeled behavior             
due to it containing all benign behavior. For arrangement A6, the sixth day was used for                
testing.  
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In A1, OfficeB is normal behavior, and CICIDS2017 is abnormal behavior. A1 has             
labeled abnormal behavior that consists of Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac users with            
unlabeled abnormal behavior consisting of Linux and Windows users. In A2, OfficeB is normal              
behavior, and CICIDS2017 is abnormal behavior. A2 has labeled abnormal behavior as only             
Ubuntu users and unlabeled abnormal behavior as Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac users. This             
difference between A1 and A2 is due to some preliminary testing that showed behavior              
patterns were similar among users with shared operating systems in the CICIDS2017 data             
set. More analysis of the CICIDS2017 data set is required to formally define the number of                
unique behavior patterns used, which is outside the scope of this paper and addressed in               
the Future Directions section. Using only CICIDS2017 to test the model gives results that              
could stem from some bias in how the traffic is created, so a combination of               
CICIDS2017 and the IIS data is used as there is a distinct difference between the two                
data sets. The bias with CICIDS2017 stems from how the model can both distinguish the               
different users but also can distinguish the different operating systems. The model’s ability to              
distinguish the different operating systems may be related to the 25 simulated user             
behaviors found within the seven simulated users I use from CICIDS2017. From the 25              
simulated user behaviors, it is not guaranteed that one behavior is not spread out over multiple                
machines. Thus, A1 covers the scenario when unlabeled abnormal behavior is possibly            
identical to labeled abnormal behavior. In A3, CICIDS2017 is normal behavior, and            
OfficeB is abnormal behavior. As each user in OfficeB has unique behavior, an arbitrary              
order is selected. The labeled normal behavior from CICIDS2017 has Windows, Ubuntu, and             
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 Mac users represented. A4 and A5 are the same as A2 and A3, respectively, except using                
OfficeA instead of OfficeB. In A6, OfficeA is the only data set used. In A7 and A8, I use a mix                     
of all three data sets. Labeled normal behavior is set to P12 (OfficeA) for both A7 and A8.                  
A7 labeled abnormal behavior is set to a Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac machine from              
CICIDS2017 as well as a selection of three users from OfficeB. In A8, the labeled abnormal                
behavior is similar except that only Ubuntu machines are used from CICIDS2017. In both A7               
and A8, the unlabeled abnormal behavior is one user from OfficeB who was left out of                
the  labeled  behavior, P2 from CICIDS2017, and P15 from OfficeA. 
 
The deep learning models are trained with 10,000 steps to ensure the convergence of the cost                
output from the network and to ensure that all of the input data is selected by the                 
random batch selection for each iteration. I train all 24 different models using a time               
-series ​t of 5. This time-series amount is enough for distinguishing behavior patterns and              
small enough for the models to be applicable in real-time analysis of network traffic. I use a                 
batch size ​b ​of 128 for loading training data and an embedded size ​n ​of 40 in the ResNet.                   
The testing batch size is 500 for better accuracy. 
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 5.4 Training 
Figure 6 shows the general layout of the training for the model. Each step in the training                 
outputs training and testing accuracy. In Figure 6, the classify function is detailed to show               
the output labels. The labels outputted by the classification function are discussed in the              
next section. The other functions used are self-explanatory. The algorithm loads data and does              
training and testing on the loaded data. The loaded data for training is either four or seven                 
days of user data, and the testing data is one day. This is later discussed in the Results section.                   
The train function has a tr_Cost value, which is the difference measure between the input               
labels and the output labels from the deep learning model. The tr_Cost eventually             
converges to zero after an adequate number of training steps. When the tr_Cost is approximately               
zero, training of the model is finished, and the final trained and tested results are outputted.                
Otherwise, the trained and tested results for that step are outputted, and the training data is fed                 
back into the model for the next training step. The results include the training step number                
as  well  as the accuracy of training and testing data. 
 
The input data from each person is separated with at least one day being test data denoted Pite                  
and the remaining days being training data denoted Pitr where ​i ​represents a person. Here the                
test data is not used for learning. One person ​i ​is labeled normal behavior. All others are                 
either labeled abnormal behavior or unlabeled abnormal behavior. There is also a learning             
set where one person in the learning set is labeled normal behavior, and the other people                
in the learning set are labeled abnormal behavior. There is a testing set of people that is a                  
complement to the learning set, which consists of unlabeled abnormal behavior. This testing             
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 set of people is not used for learning. The learning set must have at least three people and at                   
most |G\(S​n​∪S​m​)|-1 as to allow for generalization of abnormal behavior and still have at              
least  one  unlabeled  test person. 
 
For the experiments, I use one person as labeled normal behavior and three people as               
labeled abnormal behavior making the size of the learning set four people. The training set I use                 
is dependent on the data set used. Data from the lab consists of eight days of network                 
data per person with seven being used for the training set. Data from the CICIDS2017               
data set consists of five days of network data per person; however, the data set behavior is                 
simulated with four being used for the training set. The data sets used in the experiments                
are discussed  in the section on data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
DocuSign Envelope ID: 2C895588-AF15-47A1-B85C-5A9F8704F79C
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Result: ​Classification Accuracy of Test Data 
Function:  
classify(data1, data2){ 
data_normal, data_else = process(data1,data2); 
# data_normal_label is [1,0], data_else_label is [0,1] 
return data_normal, data_else;} 
while ​do_training 
load(training_data, testing_data); 
if ​results ​then 
input = results _ training_data; 
else 
input = training_data; 
labeled_input = training_labels(input); 
trained = train(labeled_input); 
tested = classify(training_data, testing_data); 
tr_Cost = trained.get_tr_Cost(); 
if ​tr_Cost ~ 0 ​then 
do_training = FALSE; 
return trained, tested; 
else  
results = trained; 
print(trained, tested); 
 
Figure 6: Algorithm of the deep learning model 
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 5.5 Results 
 
Table 4: Average performance for A1 - A5 with 10k training steps 
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Table 5: Average performance for A6 with 10k training steps 
 
Table 6: Average performance for A7 & A8 with 10k training steps 
 
Figures 7 through 12 represent the experimental results based on two datasets: CICIDS2017             
and IIS. Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 depict changes of the true positive ratios (TPR)                 
over the 10,000 training iterations. All converge to a true positive ratio of nearly one. The                
spikes generated training steps where new data is learned as 10,000 isn’t guaranteed to cover all                
of the network data. More training can give better convergence. The changes in the false               
positive ratios (FPR) over 10,000 training steps are seen in Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9.                 
The FPR also has some spikes due to the model learning new data. 
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 The test performance for each arrangement after 10,000 training steps can be found in Table               
4, Table 5, and Table 6. Table 4 has arrangements A1 to A5, Table 5 has the                 
sub-arrangements of A6, and Table 6 has sub-arrangements of A7 and A8. This             
separation is because there are separate arrangement types with the main difference in the              
structure of the labeled normal behavior and sources of data. As discussed previously, the TPR               
converges very close to a ratio of one, and the FPR converges very close to zero. These results                  
maintain an average accuracy above 97% and an execution time of around 100 ms after training                
the model. 
 
In Table 6, I did a combination of data different from all other arrangements. This               
combination  is  done  to  further show the strength of the model and to remove bias from the 
testing. In the results found in Table 6, the average of four simulations per sub-arrangement is                
used.  In  the  selection  of both  labeled  and  unlabeled  behavior,  I  picked  an  arbitrary 
grouping from the CICIDS2017 and IIS data sets. The column Test Data represents a              
combination of arrangement-labeled normal-unlabeled abnormal. I made two arrangements, A7          
and A8, to show results when using a variety of machines from the CICIDS2017 data set while                 
still using a variety of machines from the IIS collected data set. Some of the more surprising                 
results come from testing with P15. P15 is from OfficeA, and OfficeA is not used in labeled                 
abnormal behavior. This shows that this truly unknown behavior, as in behavior not from the               
same network, is labeled as abnormal behavior. Thus, the model is very effective in using live                
network data. 
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 These results suggest the algorithm is successful in using behavior to classify unknown user              
traffic, both when looking at individual users within a network and when comparing user 
behavior from different networks. The algorithm maintains a minimal FPR less than 1.2% on              
average, which gives credence to the idea that the time-series pattern for each user is distinct 
enough for classification. The low FPR means the model is resistant to the base rate               
fallacy problem. The algorithm is applicable to real-time traffic analysis. The main constraint             
is the time it takes for a user to create five conversations, or sessions, worth of traffic.                 
This  lag  is  necessary  to  collect enough data to establish a pattern of behavior. 
 
During the experiments, I found some cases that the algorithm does not work well. Figure 8                
and Figure 1, which include A6-P14 (A6c) and A6-P15 (A6d), show these cases. After              
exploring their data, the behavior of these two users was found to be very similar to each other,                  
which caused learning issues when training the model using either user as labeled normal              
behavior. Users P14 and P15 at the time were working on the same project collaboratively. To                
fix these bad results, more data is required to capture the users’ normal unique behavior better.                
Also, having a general work schedule associated with the data collection can help discover              
strange portions of the data. When discussing the results below, I ignore A6-P14 and              
A6-P15. 
 
For the efficiency matter, I measured the execution time of the algorithm. Each training step               
takes 85.20 ± 0.60 milliseconds (ms) with a total training time of approximately 852              
seconds for the 10,000 training steps. The experiment showed that SuperB achieved high             
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 accuracy and low false positives of unknown anomaly detection when using a small time              
series of ​t = 5, which execution time is approximately 420 ms. The main technologies used                
for the testing are an Intel Core i9-7920X CPU, GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU, and               
Tensorflow  version 1.12. 
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Figure 7: False positive ratios for A1 - A5 
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Figure 8: False positive ratios for A6 
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Figure 9: False positive ratios for A7 & A8 
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Figure 10: True positive ratios for A1 - A5 
44 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
T
ru
e 
po
si
tiv
e 
ra
tio
Training iteration
A1-P9 A1-P10 A1-P11 A1-P8
A2-P9 A2-P10 A2-P11 A2-P8
A3-P5 A3-P6 A3-P7 A3-P1
A4-P13 A4-P14 A4-P15 A4-P12
A5-P2 A5-P5 A5-P7 A5-P1
DocuSign Envelope ID: 2C895588-AF15-47A1-B85C-5A9F8704F79C
Figure 11: True positive ratios for A6 
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Figure 12: True positive ratios for A7 & A8
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 5.6 Future Directions 
 
There is further work and experimentation to be done regarding this research. A majority of               
the behavior data comes from visited web addresses. More experiments are needed where             
more visited web addresses are used. This is predicted to improve results. To achieve zero false                
positives, and in turn a perfect accuracy, more data should be used to ensure that any patterns of                  
behavior by users are adequately captured. Some behaviors can span over certain times of              
the year or month, such as when certain sports are being played, and users have a live                 
stream of the games being played. Other behaviors can be periodic with weeks in between               
such as when employees interact with their bank on paydays for a company. However, to the                
best of my knowledge, there are no public network data sets fitting these criteria. More data                
arrangements can be used in experiments to further test the model as the different arrangements               
would test the robustness of the model. The CICIDS2017 data set needs a further analysis of                
the individual behavior patterns among the different machines used in the simulated            
network data. It has been verified through testing that each operating system has a              
unique  pattern  of  behavior that can be used in the model. All of these improvements are 
left open for further research. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, I proposed a solution for network anomaly detection using a classification              
approach of individual user behavior. This created a general solution that can be applied to               
entire networks for anomaly detection network-wide. This solution is a semi-supervised deep            
learning approach that showed a high accuracy rate of detecting unlabeled abnormal behavior.             
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first approach to detect network anomalies by                
defining legitimate users’ normal behaviors using network conversations. The proposed          
architecture consists of a nine-layer ResNet coupled with a bidirectional RNN that has an              
attention layer. The results from the experiment showed that SuperB achieved high accuracy             
and low false positives of unknown anomaly detection when using a small time series of ​t ​= 5.                  
The accuracy averaged above 97%, and the FPR remained on average less than 1.2%.              
The TPR, which is equivalent to recall rate, shows that almost no mislabeling occurred,              
even when only using live network data. All of these results are from 10,000 training steps on                 
40 different simulations using this algorithm. 
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